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Notes
PRESIDENTIAL POWER TO INSTITUTE
CORPORATE LITIGATION
The prima facie power of the president of a corporation to institute
suit in the name of the corporation is generally thought to be incidental
to the regular course of the corporation's business.- Where vital
interests of the corporation are endangered a failure of the president
to institute suit may render him liable to the corporation.2 The power
of the president to institute suit may be express,3 implied 4 or an in-
herent function of the corporate office.5 Regardless of the source of the
authority it is normally restricted to litigation incidental to the regular
course of the corporation's business. 6
Where there is an intra-company dispute causing a deadlock among
the shareholders and directors the presumptive authority of the presi-
dent is negated.7 This deadlock possibility seems to arise frequently
in the closely held corporation where two factions have equal control
of the board of directors.8 Professor O'Neal explains the dilemma
occurring in the close corporation by stating:
In a publicly held corporation disputes among the shareholders
or directors are settled by the principle of majority rule. In close
corporations, on the other hand, voting shares and membership on the
directorate may be evenly divided between opposing factions, or
minority interests may hold veto powers over shareholders and
director action; and deadlocks occur with alarming frequency. When
a deadlock ensues is the corporation doomed to corporate paralysis
until one faction yields? Or may the officers take action at least to
conserve the corporate assets?9
11 Homstein, Corporation Law and Practice § 515 (1959); 2 Fletcher,
Corporations § 618 (Rev. ed. 1954); Note, 48 Yale L.J. 1082, 1083 (1939).2 Elblum Holding Corp. v. Mintz, 120 N.I.L. 604, 1 A.2d 204 (1938); see 1
Hornstein, op. cit. supra note 1, at 641.
3 N.Y. Stock Corp. Law § 60 provides:
The directors ... may appoint .. . officers .. . who shall respectively have
such powers and perform such duties in the management of the property and
affairs of the corporation, subject to the control of the directors, as may be
prescribed by them or in the by-laws.
4 See Annot., 10 A.L.R.2d 701, 707 (1950).
5 See 2 Fletcher, op. cit. supra note 1, § 618 at 764.
6 1 Hornstein, op. cit. supra note 1, at 640; Lattin, Corporations § 230 (1959);
89 U. Pa. L. Rev. 886 (1941); Note, 48 Yale L.I. 1082 (1939); 23 Wash. U.L.Q.
117 (1937).
7 1 Hornstein, op. cit. supra note 1, at 640.
8 Ibid.
9 2 ONeal, Close Corporations § 8.06 at 97 (1958).
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The New York Court of Appeals has had occasion to consider
Professor O'Neal's questions in an interesting series of decisions
rendered during the last decade. In the first of these decisions, Sterling
Indus., Inc. v. Ball Bearing Pen Corp.,'0 plaintiff corporation was
formed and controlled by two factions. One of these factions on the
board of directors also controlled the defendant corporation. The
president of plaintiff corporation called a meeting of plaintiff's board
of directors to consider whether plaintiff should sue defendant corpora-
tion for an alleged breach of contract. As could be expected the mem-
bers of plaintiffs board who controlled defendant voted against the
suit and since the other faction voted for the suit, the board was dead-
locked. The president of plaintiff declared that the motion to bring
suit had not passed, but he nevertheless instituted the suit. The court
of appeals held that plaintiff corporation had not authorized the institu-
tion or prosecution of the action. The court emphasized that if the
action had been allowed there would in effect have been an amend-
ment to the New York statutory norm"' relative to the powers of the
board of directors to make it read that "the corporation shall be
managed by its board of directors, except in the case of deadlock when
it shall be managed by any director who happens to be president."1
2
The court did not decide whether the president could have initiated
a valid suit where emergency conditions existed as no emergency was
alleged by plaintiff.'3
The next in the series of New York cases was that of Rothman &
Schneider v. Beclerman,'4 in which an action for conversion of corpo-
rate assets was instituted by the secretary-treasurer of plaintiff corpora-
tion against defendant Beckerman, the president's son-in-law. The
president had retired some months previously, leaving the secretary-
treasurer to manage and operate the business. The president and the
secretary-treasurer, along with their respective wives, each owned
fifty per cent of the corporation's stock and all four individuals com-
prised the board of directors. The secretary-treasurer had not sub-
mitted the question of the suit against Beckerman to the board for its
consideration. Nevertheless, the court of appeals held that the secre-
tary-treasurer had implied authority to institute and prosecute the
action commenting that "where there has been no direct prohibition
by the board . . . the president has presumptive authority . . . to
102 98 N.Y. 483, 84 N.E.2d 790 (1949).
1 N. Y. Gen. Corp. Law § 27: "The business of a corporation shall be
managed by its board of directors. .. "
.12 Sterling Indus., Inc. v. Ball Bearing Pen Corp., 298 N.Y. 483, 492, 84
N.E.2d 790, 794 (1949). (Courts emphasis omitted.)
'3 Ibid.
14 2 N.Y.2d 493, 141 N.E.2d 610, 161 N.Y.S.2d 118 (1957).
KEm-ucKy LAw JouRNAL
defend and prosecute suits in the name of the corporation." 15 The court
pointed out that the corporation was of the closely held variety
operating informally, and that "having in mind the realities of the
situation"'16 the courts below were warranted in allowing the secretary-
treasurer to bring the action, and that the "defendants .. ., complete
strangers to the corporation... , should not be permitted to question
his authority....17 Thus the primary factors distinguishing this
decision from Sterling Indus., Inc. v. Ball Bearing Pen Corp., were that
here the suit was against "outsiders" and there was not a direct
prohibition against the suit by the board of directors.
In Paloma Frocks v. Shamokin Sportswear Corp.,'8 decided in 1958,
Judge Desmond stated the issue before the court as follows:
[W]hen a contract between two corporations includes a general
arbitration clause, may the president of one contracting party without
specific authorization from his directors commence an arbitration of
an alleged dispute, when half of the directors of his corporation
represent the other contracting party on his corporation's board and
presumably would not vote in favor of bringing the dispute before
arbitrators?'9
The court answered the question in the affirmative, again distinguishing
the Sterling decision by pointing out that here the board of directors
had not passed upon the president's action while in the Sterling case
the board had considered but failed to affirm the president's conduct.
20
The court also relied upon the theory that the president was "merely
carrying out an existing agreement that all disputes under this contract
would be submitted to arbitration."21 Thus the board of directors had
already affirmed the arbitration agreement in general and the presi-
dent's submission of the dispute to arbitrators "was a routine step in
the performance of an authorized contract."22 The court did recognize
that the board of directors could have forbidden a particular arbitra-
tion, but in the absence of such a prohibition an "authorization of a
corporation president to agree to a general arbitration clause amounts
to an authorization to the president to carry on arbitrations of such
disputes as may arise."23 It should be noted that here, as in Rothman
& Schneider v. Beckerman,24 the suit was against "outsiders" and there
15Id. at 497, 141 N.E.2d at 618, 161 N.Y.S.2d at 121. (Emphasis added.)
16 Id. at 499, 141 N.E. 2d at 614, 161 N.Y.S.2d at 123 (1957).
17 Ibid.
18 3 N.Y.2d 572, 147 N.E.2d 777, 170 N.Y.S.2d 509 (1958).
19 Id. at 578, 147 N.E.2d at 780, 170 N.Y.S.2d at 510.
20 Id. at 575, 147 N.E.2d at 781, 170 N.Y.S.2d at 511.
21 Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
24 2 N.Y.2d 493, 141 N.E.2d 610, 161 N.Y.S.2d 118 (1957).
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was not a direct prohibition of the president's action by the board of
directors.
In 1959 the court of appeals of New York handed down its decision
in West View Hills, Inc. v. Lizau Realty Corp.25 Here the president of
a three-man corporation initiated an action in the name of the
corporation against defendant corporation whose controlling officers
were the same as those in control of plaintiff corporation. Plaintiff
alleged that the officers of defendant had so mismanaged plaintiff as to
cause it to pay the construction costs of a building owned by defendant.
Plaintiff's president did not ask the board of directors to consider the
question of whether a suit should have been brought against de-
fendant. It was obvious, of course, that permission to sue would have
been denied. Thus the president of plaintiff relied only on an implied
presumptive power of the president to bring the action. Emphasizing
that a corporate entity has independent legal rights, the court afirmed
the power of the president to initiate the action even though a majority
of the board of directors was in a position to withhold authorization
for the suit. The principle stated in Rothman & Schneider v. Becker-
man28 and followed in Paloma Frocks, Inc. v. Shamokin Sportswear
Corp.,27 that absent an express prohibition by the board of directors
"the president has presumptive authority, in the discharge of his duties,
to defend and prosecute suits in the name of the corporation"28 was
accepted as controlling by the court.
29
Judge Froessel severely criticized the position taken by the majority
of the court in the West View Hills case. In his dissenting opinion he
said:
The majority of the court is now holding that a minority stockholder,
merely because he was president... may now sue, upon the theory
of implied authority and in the name of the corporation, the majority
stockholders who are the two remaining directors.30
Judge Froessel also criticized the continued adherence by the majority
of the court to the proposition that the failure of the president to
submit the question of the suit to the board of directors was a satis-
factory basis for distinguishing the Sterling decision. On this point,
he said:
25 6 N.Y.2d 844, 160 N.E.2d 622, 189 N.Y.S.2d 868 (1959); accord, Berma
Management Corp. v. 140 W. 42d St. Realty, Inc., 197 N.Y.S.2d 18 (Sup. Ct.
1960).
282 N.Y.2d 493, 141 N.E.2d 610, 161 N.Y.S.2d 118 (1957).
27 3 N.Y.2d 572, 147 N.E.2d 779, 170 N.Y.S.2d 509 (1958).
2 8 R othman & Schneider v. Beckerman, 2 N.Y.2d 493, 497, 141 N.E.2d 610,
613, 161 N.Y.S.2d 118, 121 (1957).
29 West View Hills, Inc. v. Lizau Realty Corp., 6 N.Y.2d 344, 346, 160 N.E.2d
622, 623, 189 N.Y.S.2d 863, 864 (1959).
0 Id. at 348, 160 N.E.2d at 625, 189 N.YS.2d at 866.
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However relevant the absence of direct prohibition may be in a dead-
lock situation, it can hardly be decisive where the president has actual
knowledge that a maiority of the board of directors oppose the suit.
To consider it decisive would be to exalt form above substance to a
degree never countenanced by this court.31
The majority of the court did not directly discuss one of the primary
reasons for disallowing the implied presidental suit; if such suits are
allowed then the management and control of the corporation tends to
shift from the board of directors to the president.3 2 Even though it
be recognized that the corporation as a separate legal entity has
separate, independent legal rights Judge Froessel commented that
"such a decision... runs counter to the basic principles of corporate
law and holds in effect that a corporation is to be managed by its
president and not by its board of directors." 33 So it is possible now in
New York for the president of a corporation to initiate a suit in the
name of the corporation, even though a majority of the board of direc-
tors of the corporation would have voted against bringing the suit had
the issue been submitted to the board. This result encompasses more
than a mere solution of the deadlock problem which was first presented
to the court in the Sterling case as there was no deadlock in the West
Vieu Hills case. In certain instances it may be imperative to allow the
president of a corporation to act where the corporation's board of
directors is deadlocked. But should the principles developed to allow
the president to so act have any relevancy where there is not a
deadlock?
The problem presented by this series of New York cases involves
primarily two conflicting policies :34 (1) that the corporation is a
separate legal entity with independent legal rights which the president
is under a duty to invoke when the situation so demands; 35 (2) that
the president, as a minority shareholder, should not be allowed to use
the corporate suit as a route through which to oppose the policies of
fellow directors, but should be restricted to the minority shareholder's
derivative suit.36 Deadlock and disagreement occur frequently in
31 Id. at 349, 160 N.E.2d at 625, 189 N.Y.S.2d at 867.
32 Sterling Indus., Inc. v. Ball Bearing Pen Corp., 298 N.Y. 483, 84 N.E.2d
790 (1949).33 West View Hills, Inc. v. Lizau Realty Corp., 6 N.Y.2d 344, 348, 160
N.E.2d 622, 625, 189 N.Y.S.2d 863, 866 (1959).
34 See 82 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 415 (1960); 34 St. Tobn's L. Rev. 330 (1960);
West View Hills, Inc. v. Lizau Realty Corp., supra note 33, at 350, 160 N.E.2d at
626. 189 N.Y.S.2d at 867 (dissenting opinion).
35 See 2 O'Neal, op. cit. supra note 9, § 8.06 at 97, 104.
36 Ibid.; see also 34 St. Tohn's L. Rev. 330 (1960), for an exposition of the
respective advantages and disadvantages between the president's suit in the name
of the corporation and the minority shareholder's derivative suit.
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closely held corporations.3 7 Though it cannot always be said that such
situations are unforseen at the initiation of the enterprise,3 8 the present
state of New York law, which emphasises formalisms such as the
absence of direct prohibition by the board, can invite abuse of the
policy of allowing presidental suits to represent the independent
corporate entity.3 9 Professor O'Neal suggests a solution which pierces
the corporate veil to determine the actual relationship of the parties
involved in the suit. He states the ingredients of his formula in the
following language:
Whenever the shareholders and directors of a corporation are dead-
locked, an officer of the corporation will not be permitted to prosecute
or defend litigation in the name of the corporation, if the inability of
the shareholders and directors to reach a decision on whether to
litigate is the result of an honest difference of opinion over corporate
policy; but, he will be permitted to prosecute or defend in the name
of the corporation litigation necessary to protect its vital interests, if
a faction of the shareholders or directors is obviously using its power
under a veto or shared control arrangement to bring about a deadlock
for a fraudulent or unfair purpose.40
North Carolina, in accordance with the philosophy41 of its new
Business Corporation Act, stressing the particular needs of the close
corporation, has enacted a statutory provision which would cure the
deadlock problem facing many closely held corporations. The pro-
vision states that "the president has authority to institute or defend
legal proceedings when directors are deadlocked."42 It should be
37 1 Hornstein, op. cit. supra note 1, § 515; 1 O'Neal, op. cit. supra note 9,
§ 8.06.
38 See Israels, The Sacred Cow of Corporate Existence, 19 U. Chi. L. Rev. 778
(1952). The language of the New York court in a recent decision, Application of
Paloma Frocks, Inc., 1 App. Div. 2d 640, 152 N.Y.S.2d 652, 654 (1956), affd
mem., 2 N.Y.2d 934, 142 N.E.2d 205 (1957), is illustrative of the problem often
facing promoters of small closely held enterprises:
if the president of a corporation is considered to have carte blanche, the
right to institute actions in the name of the corporation without approval of
the board of directors, the result would be to destroy to a large extent the
protection which is sought by parties who engage in a corporate enterprise
under an agreement that the stock and directorate control will be equally
divided. Thus if one of the parties to the agreement were allowed to act
independently and against the wishes of the other.., the very purpose of
the agreement for equal control would be frustrated.
a9 See the dissenting opinion in West View Hills, Inc. v. Lizau Realty Corp.,
6 N.Y. 2d 844, 348, 160 N.E.2d 622, 625, 189 N.Y.S.2d 863, 866 (1959) where
ludge Froessel depicts in detail the economic inequities which followed the result
in the West View Hills decision.
40 2 O'Neal, op. cit. supra note 9, § 8.06 at 104.
41 See Latty, The Close Corporation And The New North Carolina Business
Corporation Act, 84 N.C. L. Rev. 432, 438 (1956). The new North Carolina
corporation law recognizes that many closely held corporations are little more
than incorporated partnerships and as such have problems which are not aided by
developments in the law of the public issue corporation.42 North Carolina Business Corporation Act § 55-34 (c) (Supp. 1957).
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noted that this North Carolina statute provides only for suits in the
case of deadlock and does not envisage allowing the president to sue
in the name of the corporation when a majority of the board of
directors is against the suit. Thus New York by judicial edict has gone
further than the North Carolina legislature chose to go in that New
York allows corporate suits to be initiated by the president where the
president has not submitted the question of the suit to the board of
directors even though a majority of the board disapproves of the
action.
The problem of deadlock arising in the closely held corporation
does demand a forthright solution such as the one reached in North
Carolina.43 New York sought to resolve the question in the series of
decisions culminating in West View Hills v. Lizau Realty Corp. The
New York solution to the deadlock problem in the close corporation
may be criticized because of its extension to include a situation where
there was not a deadlock, but regardless of the merits of the solution
as related to close corporations, an important question may arise if the
same reasoning is used in a situation of internal corporate conflict
involving a public issue corporation. As a practical matter deadlock
does not frequently arise in the public issue corporation.44 Thus North
Carolina's statutory solution will likely have no significance except as
to the closely held corporation. But New York's solution meets not
only the deadlock situation commonly found in the close corporation
but also encompasses the situation where there is not a deadlock; the
president of the corporation is in fact acting against the wishes of a
majority of the board of directors. Now that the New York court will
allow the president of a closely held corporation to bring a corporate
action even though against the wishes of a majority of the board of
directors, will it also allow the president of a public issue corporation
to bring a corporate action when a majority of the board of directors
is opposed to the suit? The management and operation of the typical
public issue corporation is often a far different problem than the one
facing the officers of the closely held corporation. 45 In fact, the con-
trolling shareholders of the closely held corporation often operate the
enterprise much in the manner of a partnership with little of the
formality and patterns of procedure used in the operation of a public
issue corporation.46 The basic premise in controlling the operation of
a public issue corporation is usually majority rule,47 while the con-
43 See Israels, supra note 38.
44 See O'Neal, op. cit. supra note 9, § 8.06.
45 See Israels, supra note 38; Latty, supra note 41.
46 See Stevens, Private Corporations § 10 (2d ed. 1949).
47 O'Neal, op. cit. supra note 9, § 8.06.
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trolling shareholders of a closely held corporation may have specifically
provided for deadlock situations should internal dissension arise within
the group.48 In the closely held enterprise the preservation of an
independent legal right at the initiation of the president may be of
utmost importance to the continued existence of the enterprise.
Individual shareholders in the closely held corporation may sometime
need every means available to protect their own and the corporation's
interests. However, a solution for this problem which, if applied to
the public issue corporation, would allow the president to ignore the
wishes of a majority of the board of directors and sue in the corporate
name violates the majority rule thesis of control in the public issue
corporation. In those instances where the ownership of the public
issue corporation is almost completely divorced from the control and
management, gross inequities might occur if the president were allowed
to use the corporate suit to foster personal interests in a fight for
control.
Therefore, a solution for the deadlock problem arising in close
corportions should encompass nothing more than a rectification of that
problem alone, with no implications as to situations involving the
public issue corporation. As a result of the West View Hills decision
the possibility of such an application now exists in New York. Whether
the reasoning of the New York court in the West View Hills decision
will be limited to those instances involving close corporations remains
to be seen. The problem of deadlock which plagues the closely held
corporation can be adequately met by a statutory provision such as
the one enacted in North Carolina; the provision in practical effect is
limited in its application to closely held corporations.
Richard W. Spears
48 Israels, supra note 88; Israels, The Close Corporation and the Law, 33
Cornell L.Q. 488 (1948); Latty, supra note 41.
